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Abstract
Each year, the US Air Force Academy graduates nearly 1000 young men and women. To support the decision of
which cadets will be classified into which career fields, we describe a linear programming formulation with appealing
computational properties that enable it as the core of a decision support tool. We explore methods for measuring and
balancing cadets class standing, Air Force career field requirements, and cadets career field preferences in the context
of this model. Our computational experiments demonstrate the improvement of this method over previous classification
approaches, yielding more than 10% increase in the number of cadets assigned to their top career field choice and
yielding nearly a 100% reduction in the number of cadets not receiving any of their career field choices. We also explore
alternative methods for measuring cadets career field preferences and demonstrate the positive effect of the new
measurement scheme on the overall classification. Because of the short running time of this model, it will serve as a
flexible, real-time component of the Academys classification process.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Each year, the United States Air Force Acad-
emy in Colorado Springs, CO graduates and
commissions roughly one thousand young men
and women as Air Force officers. Following their
commissioning, each member of the graduating
class begins his or her service in one of nearly three
dozen career fields. In past years, the process by
which each was assigned to a career field was
manually intensive and often resulted in a signifi-
cant percentage of graduates assigned to fields in
which they had little prior interest.
In this paper, we describe an optimization-
based methodology for assisting the classification
process, which is the process of matching gradu-
ating officers to career fields. The model balances
the personnel needs of the Air Force with indi-
viduals career field preferences and their perfor-
mance during four years at the Academy. The
assignments suggested by the model provide an
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initial starting point for the Academys personnel
office and the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC)
in San Antonio, TX to make the final Air Force
Specialty Code (AFSC) assignments. The speed of
the model and its ability to identify the marginal
value of alternate career field allocations make it
an attractive real-time tool to support personnel
planners and analysts.
We make the following significant contribu-
tions:
• model and implement this decision problem as a
flexible and easily-solved network flow model;
• demonstrate the performance of the model
using data from the Academys graduating
classes of 2001 and 2002; and
• demonstrate the benefits of collecting more de-
tailed information regarding individual job
preferences.
This paper is organized as follows. We describe
the career field classification process and create a
network flow model to aid in this process. We then
illustrate several methods for establishing trade-
offs between cadet preferences and their class rank.
To better match cadets with their top job choices,
we propose a change to the manner in which cadet
job preferences are measured. Finally, we examine
these methods when applied the graduating classes
of 2001 and 2002. Our work with the Class of 2001
provided a baseline for this multi-year project, and
our work with the Class of 2002 served as a pro-
totype and proof-of-concept of a complete classi-
fication system. This work led to a fully automated
system that was adopted and implemented by the
Air Force for initial use with the Class of 2003.
2. The Air Force career field classification process
Each fall, the Academy initiates the process of
collecting cadet AFSC preferences, ranking the
cadets relative to their peers, and assigning cadets
to career fields based on rankings, preferences, and
quotas (summarized in Fig. 1). We provide detail
on the major elements of this process.
2.1. Ranking cadets
Each fall, a central board of senior Academy
leaders convenes to provide an overall assessment
of each cadets performance during his or her four
years at the Academy. This assessment takes into
consideration a cadets academic performance,
athletic performance, and leadership involvement.
Their assessment is a combination of objective and
subjective measures that results in a score between
30 and 50 points for each cadet.
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Fig. 1. The Academys process of ranking its graduates and assigning them to initial career fields.
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This ‘‘AFSC board’’ consists of ten members
divided equally into two separate panels. The
composition of each panel ensures representation
from each of the Academys mission areas: aca-
demics, athletics, and leadership training. Each
panel evaluates between 450 and 500 cadets, de-
pending on the actual graduating class size. For a
given panel, each reviewer rates only the members
from that panels batch of cadets. Each panel mem-
ber assigns each cadet a score between 6 and 10, and
the overall rating is a sum of the five panel mem-
bers individual scores. The results from each panel
are standardized and combined into a single rank-
ordered list of all cadets in the graduating class.
2.2. Classifying cadets
Cadets will enter a career field in one of two
general categories: rated and non-rated. Rated ca-
dets are those who will enter a flying career field
(i.e., pilot or navigator) and non-rated cadets are
those entering a non-flying career field. Each year,
AFPC officials determine the number of rated slots
available to the Academy. Pilot-qualified cadets
compete for those slots according to the rank they
receive from the AFSC board. In recent years,
nearly every physically qualified graduate received
a pilot slot. This report focuses upon the process of
classifying non-rated cadets into career fields.
All cadets are asked in the fall of the senior year
to pick their top six non-rated AFSCs and to
specify their preference on a 1–6 scale, with 1 in-
dicating their top choice. In past years, this clas-
sification followed a greedy matching process.
Beginning with the top ranked cadet (based upon
AFSC Board results), each cadet selected their
AFSC from the set of available AFSCs. In general,
this method assured the top of the rank ordering
of getting their top AFSC choice. The lower
ranked cadets were less likely to receive their top
choices and were increasingly likely to face a set of
AFSCs that were not among their original six
choices. Because of the limitations of this greedy
classification process, we proposed a new optimi-
zation-based process for classifying cadets to
AFSCs. This process meets Air Force needs, re-
wards the Academys top performers, and recog-
nizes the preferences of all cadets.
3. Optimization-based classification model
Given the described process, we offer the fol-
lowing model to assist this classification decision.
Let set I represent all non-rated cadets considered
in the selection process and set J denote all pos-
sible jobs (e.g., career fields). The value of assign-
ing cadet i 2 I to job j 2 J is denoted by cij. We
defer the important discussion of how we arrive at
this value to later sections. AFPC provides target
quotas for each AFSC. More generally, we allow
AFPC to specify lower and upper limits for each
career field, denoted by lj and uj.
Our primary decision is to determine the best
assignment of cadets to jobs (the definition of best
remains). We model this with the binary decision
variable, yij, which equals 1 if cadet i is assigned to
job j and zero otherwise. Through the use of slack
variables, we allow deviation from the upper and
lower limits for each job. The variable sþj is the
amount by which the number of cadets assigned to
job j exceeds the upper limit, uj. Similarly, sj is the
amount by which we under-fill job j. The cost of
violating the upper and lower limits are given by
dþj and d

j , respectively.
With the goal of maximizing the value of as-
signments made for the cadets, offset by the cost of
missing the Air Forces objectives for each career
fields, we introduce the following optimization
model:
max
X
i2I
X
j2J
cijyij 
X
j2J
ðdþj sþj þ dj sj Þ
subject to :
X
j2J
yij ¼ 1 i 2 I ; ð1Þ
X
i2I
yij  sþj 6 uj j 2 J ; ð2Þ
X
i2I
yij þ sj P lj j 2 J ; ð3Þ
yij 2 f0; 1g i 2 I ; j 2 J ; ð4Þ
sþj ; s

j P 0 and integer j 2 J : ð5Þ
Constraint set (1) forces the assignment of each
cadet to exactly one AFSC. Constraint set (2)
limits the number of cadets assigned to an AFSC
to the upper limit plus any deviation from that
limit. Constraint set (3) forces the number of ca-
dets assigned to an AFSC to the lower limit minus
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any deviation from that limit. Constraint sets (4)
and (5) enforce the assignment variables to be bi-
nary and the AFSC deviation to be integral.
While the model allows deviations both above
the upper AFSC limit and below the lower AFSC
limit, AFPC typically specifies a single target
quota for each AFSC and expects no deviation. As
such, we set the upper and lower limits to the
target quota and increase the costs of deviating (dþj
and dj ) from the target to be large so that the
model will satisfy the target quotas exactly.
To solve this 0–1 integer program, we only need
to solve its linear programming relaxation. This
model can be mapped directly to a network flow
problem, which has the property that any solution
to the linear programming relaxation will be inte-
gral and, therefore, optimal (see [1]). Because of
the mapping, the formulation also has the integ-
rality property and we need not consider methods
like branch and bound to find the optimal integer
solution. Moreover, because this is a network flow
problem, specialized algorithms (i.e., the network
simplex method) can be used to solve this model
within seconds. As such, the models fast run times
(i.e., seconds) make it ideal for supporting the
classification process in real-time; reducing classi-
fication iterations between the Academy and
AFPC from weeks to potentially hours.
Models of similar form have been used for
military personnel allocation, including decisions
to assign US Navy personnel to vacant jobs with
the goal of minimizing moving cost [9]. The details
of the implementation of the Navys assignment
system, including issues such as user acceptance,
are described in Blanco and Hillery [2] and
Whisman et al. [12]. Krass et al [8] describe a non-
linear network optimization problem to assist the
Navy in determining assignments of personnel to
combat duty. Reeves and Reid [10] introduces an
interactive, preference-driven manpower planning
model for the US Army Reserves. This model
balances five objectives for the assignments within
a 100 person unit over the course of a one-year
planning horizon. Weigel and Wilcox [11] describe
a hierarchy of models that support the Armys
enlisted personnel system. The models are used to
support a variety of decisions, from policy-level
analysis to detailed, unit-level planning issues. Fi-
nally, optimization methods have been applied to
decisions of manpower scheduling, including the
assignment of service department workers with
specialized skills to jobs (see [4]) and the determi-
nation of a maintenance workforce specialization
structure and the assignment of specific tasks to
workers (see Dietz and Rosenshine [6]).
The problem we consider differs from these
previous works in two key respects. First, we are
not considering one-to-one assignments of persons
to jobs; rather, we are assigning persons to career
fields, which have a required target for the number
of people. Second, our objective function does not
deal with explicit measures such as travel costs.
Ultimately, we are concerned with giving the
decision-maker, not the model, the final say re-
garding the delicate trade-off between cadet pref-
erences and their standing in the class.
3.1. The objective function
The output of the AFSC board is an aggregate
subjective score and subsequent rank order of each
cadet. The output of the cadets career field selec-
tion is a ordering, from 1 to 6, of their job pref-
erences. These two outputs combine to form the
objective function coefficients (cij) of classifying
the jth job preference to the ith ranked cadet. In
this section, we discuss alternatives for combining
the inputs (i.e., cadet rank/score and job prefer-
ence) into a single value that captures the appro-
priate trade-off between the two inputs. For
example, we might wish to make the top-ranked
cadets second choice (c1;2) equal to the middle
cadets top choice (c163;1). The exact trade-off de-
pends on the decision-makers preference. In fact,
decision-makers are more concerned with the net
effect of the objective function (i.e., the impact
upon the overall classification of cadets) than the
function itself. In this section, we first describe
methods to represent the value associated with a
cadets class rank, vðiÞ, that will give us a flexible
method for capturing this trade-off. We then show
how this value is combined with each cadets
AFSC preferences, prefði; jÞ, to yield the models
objective function coefficients:
cij ¼ f ½vðiÞ; prefði; jÞ
: ð6Þ
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In Section 3.2 we describe alternatives for repre-
senting vðiÞ and in Section 3.3 we describe methods
for representing prefði; jÞ. In Section 3.3, we
will present methods to better measure job
preferences and build them into the objective
function.
3.2. Valuing a cadet’s rank, v(i)
There are many ways to represent the value
awarded when cadets receive their top AFSC
choice. This value is one component of the overall
function described in (6). In general, we assume
that the value curve, vðiÞ, should be strictly de-
creasing with respect to class rank. The general
shape of the curve will have a drastic effect upon
how the optimization model makes trade-offs be-
tween the AFSC classification for persons with
different class standing. In this section, we explore
three such curves: (1) vðiÞ displays a constant
marginal reduction as class rank increases, (2) vðiÞ
displays a diminishing marginal reduction as class
rank increases, and (3) vðiÞ is determined by the
actual AFSC board score.
3.2.1. Constant marginal difference
In general, we would like the value awarded
for matching cadets with their top choice to be a
linear, diminishing function of board rank. That
is, the first cadet receives the greatest value. The
difference between the first and second cadets
will be the same as the second and third, which
will be the same as the third and fourth, and
so on.
Thus, the value received due to cadet rank is
given by
vðiÞ ¼ N  rankðiÞ; ð7Þ
where N is the number of graduates. If we care
only about the cadets standing relative to their
non-rated peers, N is the number of non-rated
cadets and rankðiÞ is cadet is rank within the non-
rated group. Note that this is a linear function of
rank, as shown in Fig. 2, where N is 327 (the
number of non-rated cadets in 2001). Again, this
curve represents the value awarded whenever a
cadet receives his or her top choice AFSC.
3.2.2. Decreasing marginal difference
Again, we would like the value awarded for
matching a cadet with their top choice to be a
decreasing function of class rank. In this section,
marginal change in this value, vðiÞ, should increase
rapidly as we move toward the top of the class.
This function is consistent with the philosophy
that ‘‘top’’ cadets have truly distinguished them-
selves in their four years at the Academy. The
marginal difference decreases as we move lower in
the class rank.
To capture this philosophy, we employ a
learning curve function (for example, see [3]). As-
sume N is the total number of cadets, and a is a
number between 0 and 1 that represents a rate of
learning (or the slope of the learning curve). Let i
be the cadets rank. Then the value awarded for
assigning each cadet is
vðiÞ ¼ N  ilog2 a: ð8Þ
When a is, say 0.95, the learning curve reduces the
value by 5% each time cadet rank is doubled. In
our application, the value of assigning cadet #2s
top choice returns a value that is 5% less than
cadet #1s. Assigning a top choice to cadet #4 has
a value that is 5% less than cadet #2s, and so
forth. This function provides marginal changes
consistent with the philosophy of rewarding top
performers. Fig. 3 shows the 95% learning curve
for N ¼ 327.
0
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300
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0 100 200 300 400
v(
i)
Cadet Rank
Fig. 2. Value received for first choice as a linear function of
board rank.
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3.2.3. Board score approach
Our final curve once again assumes that the
value function, vðiÞ, decreases with class rank. In
this section we introduce a function that provides
both increasing marginal rewards for top per-
formers and increasing marginal penalties for low
performers. In order to entice the model to give
more top choices to the top ranked cadets, it must
be increasingly difficult for the lowest ranked ca-
dets to get their top choices. Thus, in the lower tier
of class rank, the marginal penalty increases as we
near the bottom. Interestingly, plotting AFSC
board score (see Fig. 4) gives the desired distribu-
tion of values, vðiÞ. Moreover, this method uses
direct output from the AFSC board as an input to
the model.
3.3. Accounting for career field preferences,
pref (i,j)
In the previous sections, we described three
methods for representing a baseline value, vðiÞ, for
assigning the top choice to cadets based upon their
board rank/score. We now create the objective
function, cij, by combining the rank value, vðiÞ,
with the preferences, prefði; jÞ, that each cadet
assigns to each AFSC. The current method relies
solely upon the 1–6 preference scale provided by
cadets. We also consider a second method that
captures the relative preference (or indifference)
between their six career field choices.
3.3.1. Ordinal preferences
We denote cadet is preference for job j by
prefði; jÞ, which equals 1 for their top choice and 6
for their 6th choice. We let prefði; jÞ ¼ 0 when job
j is not one of the cadet is top six choices. The
objective function coefficient that combines both
rank and preference is given by
cij ¼
vðiÞ
prefði; jÞ ; when prefði; jÞ > 0;
vðiÞ; otherwise:
8<
: ð9Þ
Fig. 5 displays the board score (see Section 3.2.3)
family of functions. The top curve in the figure
represents the value of assigning cadets their top
choice. The second highest curve shows the value
of assigning cadets to their second AFSC choice.
The third through sixth curves represent assigning
cadets to their third through sixth AFSC. The
bottom curve is the negative of the top choice and
applies whenever a cadet is assigned to an AFSC
not listed as one of their top six.
Note that the bottom ranked cadet receives the
same value (i.e., 0) for all career fields. The model
will be indifferent about which career field to as-
sign this cadet. We can add an additional param-
eter to this method that helps control the extent to
which the lower ranked cadets are sacrificed for
the benefit of the others. The objective function
coefficients determined in (9) become
cij ¼
vðiÞ þ k
prefði; jÞ ; when prefði; jÞ > 0;
ðvðiÞ þ kÞ; otherwise:
8<
:
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
50 100 150 200 250 300 350
v(
i)
Class Rank
Value versus Class Rank 
0
Fig. 3. Value received for the first choice is a decreasing func-
tion of board rank, with decreasing marginal difference.
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Fig. 4. Value received based on board ranking.
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The effect of this change is that the curves in Fig. 5
become increasingly separated as we increase the
constant, k. This increase causes the model to
avoid assigning cadets to non-preferred jobs. Ra-
ther than selecting an a priori value for k, we vary
this parameter to provide decision-makers with a
set of possible classifications from which to
choose.
3.3.2. Relative preferences
Our primary measure of the models perfor-
mance was the number of cadets receiving their
top preference(s). Given this, we readdress how
preferences are measured. When ranking jobs on a
scale of 1–6, we have no information regarding the
relative preference between job selections. A model
that uses the objective function coefficients de-
scribed in (9) assigns significantly different values
to a cadets first and second AFSC. However, it
might be the case that the cadet is indifferent be-
tween the two AFSCs. In this situation, awarding
the cadets second choice (based upon the forced
rank ordering) may free a slot that enables a lower
ranked cadet to receive a higher preference.
Modifying our approach for creating the ob-
jective function coefficients is straightforward. We
define rði; jÞ as the relative satisfaction cadet i has
for job j. A cadets top preference(s) will receive a
relative satisfaction of 1, and all other preferences
have a value less than one. For each cadet i 2 I
and job j 2 J the objective function coefficients are
given by
cij ¼ rði; jÞ  vðiÞ if rði; jÞ > 0;vðiÞ if rði; jÞ ¼ 0;

ð10Þ
where vðiÞ is determined by methods such as the
three discussed earlier.
A number of mechanisms can be use to solicit
relative preferences from the cadets. But the
overall idea is the same: to gain some recognition
of how each cadet feels about their six job choices.
Capturing individual preferences is superior to any
of the arbitrary preference schemes inherent in the
1–6 ranking process. The bottom line is the impact
upon classifications: which cadets receive which
jobs. Because individual preferences and AFSC
quotas greatly affect the classification of each
graduating class, we do not anticipate developing a
‘‘correct set’’ of value functions. Instead, we de-
velop a process that enables decision-makers the
ability to easily, and quickly, explore the effects of
alternative functions.
4. Computational results
In this section, we offer empirical results that
demonstrate the success of this optimization-based
-10
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Fig. 5. Value received based on class rank and career field preference; receiving a non-preferred career field is penalized.
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classification model. We begin with computational
results from the Class of 2001 and demonstrate the
solution quality and its improvement over the
traditional greedy approach described in Section 2.
We then illustrate the effects of objective function
changes upon the models solution. We next turn
to the Class of 2002, with whom we examine the
effect of using individually specified preferences
{see (10)} rather than the 1–6 ranking of a cadets
six AFSC choices {as prescribed in (9)}.
Because this decision support environment re-
lies upon Excel spreadsheets and Access databases,
we opted to model within a spreadsheet environ-
ment on a Pentium III workstation. We imple-
mented the model using both the Large-Scale
Solver from Frontline Systems [7] and XPRESS-
MP version 13.0 [5]. The Frontline solver is the
large-scale version of the Excel Solver. To use
XPRESS-MP, we linked the solver to the spread-
sheets using ODBC connections and SQL. The
fact that this model is a network flow problem
means the optimal linear solution is always integer
and, hence, solve times are fast. We do not report
solution times because the model solves in seconds,
which is more than sufficient for the purposes of
our model.
4.1. Results for Class of 2001
Of the graduating class of 2001, 327 graduates
were classified into non-rated AFSCs. The AFPC
initially specified 322 target quotas across 36 ca-
reer fields, and allowed the Academy to classify the
additional 5 cadets into their preferred AFSCs. We
penalized deviation from each AFSC quota heav-
ily. Thus, the model matched each AFSC quota
exactly (aside from the difference between gradu-
ates and total target quotas).
4.1.1. Comparison with greedy classification
Our first goal was to compare the models so-
lution to that generated by the greedy classification
approach. This greedy method begins by awarding
the top-ranked cadet their first choice. We simulate
the greedy method by decrementing the number of
remaining slots in that career field and turn to the
second ranked cadet. This cadet selects their
highest choice among the remaining available
slots. The process continues until all cadets are
classified. If, in our simulated heuristic, a cadet
finds no slots among their six choices, we proceed
to the next cadet and the process continues. At the
end, we randomly assign the cadets who did not
receive one of their top six choices to the remain-
ing slots. In practice, a cadet who finds no avail-
able openings throughout their original six choices
makes a selection from any of the available
openings rather than risk a random classification.
Therefore, as we compile the statistics on the
number getting one of their six choices versus a
non-preferred career field, our heuristic over esti-
mates the number getting one of their AFSC
preferences. Recall that our heuristic does not al-
low a cadet to ‘‘take away’’ a preferred AFSC of a
lower ranked cadet if none of their preferences
were available. Thus, the quality of the solution (in
practice) can only be worse than the results re-
ported.
Table 1 provides both the results obtained using
the optimization versus the greedy heuristic. The
‘‘# assigned’’ columns indicate the number of ca-
dets who received their first choice, second choice,
and so forth (proceeding down the rows). Notice
the difference between the numbers of first choices
given using the optimization versus the existing
greedy approach. Moreover, the number of ‘‘non-
preferred’’ jobs assigned is reduced from 12 to ei-
ther 0 or 3, depending upon the objective function
used. Thus, cadet preferences are better satisfied
using the optimization. Presumably, this will have
a positive effect on morale and long-term com-
mitment to the Air Force.
4.1.2. Viewing alternative solutions
Comparing the results from the objective func-
tion reported in Table 1, we see a difference that
seems to indicate the learning curve objective
function (Fig. 3) gives a better aggregate solution.
The learning curve model reports more first pref-
erences received and zero ‘‘non-preferred’’ choices
received. However, this may be misleading as we
examine the differences more closely.
Fig. 6 displays the AFSC preference received of
all 327 cadets using the two objective functions.
While the learning curve objective function yields a
greater number of first choices, notice the large
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number of cadets in the top quarter of the class
who did not get their first choices. Conversely, the
board score objective function does award three
cadets AFSCs for which they had no preference,
but these three cadets are at the bottom of the
class. The overall effect of the board score objective
function is that the model sacrifices the preferences
of cadets at the bottom of the class to free higher
preferences for those near the top of the class.
It is not our goal to specify a single objective
function that will dominate all other objective
functions. Given that each years data changes
dramatically, it is not sensible to expect that an
objective function will have the same effect on the
classification. We emphasize that the model does
not establish policy. Rather, the model provide
multiple solutions quickly, from which the Acad-
emys decision makers can determine the trade-offs
and classification policy they prefer.
4.2. Results for Class of 2002
We developed the prototype of this model while
the Class of 2001 classification was in-process.
Because of the apparent success of the model as
applied to the Class of 2001, we conducted a full
proof-of-concept during the Class of 2002s clas-
sification process. This class had similar charac-
teristics to the previous class: 348 graduates were
classified into 37 non-rated AFSCs.
4.2.1. Comparison with greedy classification
During the 2002 classification process, senior
decision-makers specified an additional condition:
the top 25% cadets in the class were guaranteed
their top AFSC preference (assuming they were
qualified). We added the following constraints to
the model to enforce this requirement:
yij ¼ 1; 8ði; jÞ : rankðiÞ6 N
4
and prefði; jÞ ¼ 1;
where N is the number of cadets. In addition, we
penalized heavily deviations from AFSC quotas
until the model filled the targets exactly. Finally,
Table 1
Results for the Class of 2001, comparing the model using two objective functions with the greedy approach to job classification
Job preference Model results
Greedy Heuristic Learning curve objective Board score objective
# Assigned Cum% # Assigned Cum% # Assigned Cum%
1 215 65.7 248 75.8 244 74.6
2 53 82.0 42 88.7 40 86.9
3 18 87.5 14 93.0 10 89.9
4 13 91.4 7 95.1 6 91.7
5 12 95.1 9 95.9 14 96.0
6 4 96.3 7 100.0 10 99.1
No. pref 12 100.0 0 100.0 3 100.0
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Fig. 6. Graph of job preference received versus class rank using
both the learning curve objective function (a) and the board
score objective function (b).
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we used the board score (Section 3.2.3) approach
within the objective function.
The results are displayed in Table 2. The model
outperforms the greedy heuristic, moving the per-
cent of cadets receiving their first choice from 58%
to just over 69%. The number of cadets receiving
none of their job choices dropped from 22 to 3.
Thus, applying the optimization-based classifica-
tion model to the Class of 2002 data yield similar
results to those found with the Class of 2001 data.
In addition, Table 2 shows a summary of the ac-
tual classification created by the AFPC who also
used an optimization-based approach. We see the
clear advantage of our model both in terms of the
increase in the number of graduates assigned to
their top choice and in terms of the decrease in the
number of graduates assigned to none of their
choices.
4.2.2. Preference experiment
Prior to the actual classification process, during
the spring of their junior year, we collected infor-
mation regarding AFSC preference beyond the 1–
6 ranking. We surveyed 350 participants (both
rated and non-rated cadets) and compared the
AFSC classification using this additional infor-
mation {see (9)} with the existing 1–6 ranking
procedure (8).
The method we used to capture relative pref-
erences follows. We gave each cadet 1000 points to
allocate among six AFSCs. Assigning an equal
number of points to all six AFSCs indicates in-
difference among the six. Allocating all points to a
single AFSC indicates a strong preference for that
single career field, but indifference among all re-
maining AFSCs. All non-selected AFSCs received
zero preference points.
The relative satisfaction of a cadet-AFSC clas-
sification was found by dividing the points the
cadet assigned to that AFSC by the maximum
points the cadet assigned to any single AFSC.
That is, for each cadet the value of rði; jÞ used in
Eq. (9) is found by dividing the number of points
assigned to AFSC j, pði; jÞ, by the maximum
awarded to any AFSC by that cadet:
rði; jÞ ¼ pði; jÞ
maxj0
pði; j0Þ: ð11Þ
While there are a number of ways to collect and
measure these relative preferences, this method
renders a [0–1] scale.
Using board scores (Section 3.2.3) as the basis
for the objective function coefficients, we first
compare the models with the different preference
measures in the objective function. In Table 3, we
show how each model performs by counting the
number of 1–6 preferences actually assigned. On
the surface, using the relative preferences appears
to hurt the quality of the solution. Fewer people
receive their top choice. A more precise perfor-
mance measure is how the models compare with
respect to the relative preferences.
In Table 4, we see the positive effect of using the
relative preferences in the objective function. The
scale used in the left column shows the relative
preferences. If a cadet receives a job for which they
had assigned maximum points, their satisfaction
level is 100%. Furthermore, if a cadet was indif-
Table 2
Comparison of Greedy Heuristic and the actual classification with the optimization model for the Class of 2002
Job preference Model results
Greedy Heuristic Actual classification Board score objective
# Assigned Cum% # Assigned Cum% # Assigned Cum%
1 202 58.2 218 62.8 240 69.2
2 59 75.2 57 79.3 54 84.7
3 29 83.6 25 86.5 15 89.0
4 12 87.0 16 91.1 9 91.6
5 14 91.1 9 93.7 11 94.8
6 9 93.7 10 96.5 15 99.1
No. pref 22 100.0 12 100.0 3 100.0
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ferent between his two top AFSC choices (which
is impossible to determine in existing 1–6 rank-
ing system), then being classified into either of
those AFSCs would yield 100% satisfaction. Using
the relative preferences, we see a large increase
(from 76.3% to 84%) in the number of cadets
at least 50% satisfied and a corresponding reduc-
tion in the number of unsatisfied cadets. Thus,
adding relative preferences provides additional
flexibility to better meet the desires of the gradu-
ation class.
5. Concluding remarks and future work
This optimization-based approach for the
AFSC classification process provides a flexible tool
to support the decision authorities at the Academy
and the AFPC. We emphasize that from year-to-
year, variation in the data exists such that selecting
a single method for creating the objective function
is not sensible. The ease of incorporating different
objective functions and the fast run time of the
model allow us to quickly create a set of solutions
that best reflect the philosophies of decision-mak-
ers.
In addition, our explorations of using actual
AFSC preferences indicate value-added in chang-
ing from the current 1–6 ranking system. Clearly
actual preferences provide more relevant infor-
mation than arbitrarily assigning preferences to
each classification. However, obtaining true pref-
erences ignores the presence of gamesmanship,
which is likely. We have not explored this effect.
Future extensions to the system include a web-
base mechanism for displaying information about
each AFSC, its projected availability, and current
cadet interest in each AFSC. This website will
collect preference data supporting the optimiza-
tion. It will alleviate much of the time-consuming
process of advising and counseling cadets about
the likelihood of receiving certain AFSCs. The
manner in which these relative preferences are
collected is an area of further study. Finally, the
fact that this model is a network flow problem
(thus, the optimal linear solution is always integer)
means we can exploit dual information to provide
feedback on the relative interest of certain AFSCs.
The duals could be the basis to coordinate target
quotas and the AFSC classification across all three
commissioning sources: the Academy, the Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and the Officer
Training School (OTS).
Because of the demonstrated success of our
model, AFPC has revised their process. They have
implemented and will utilize this optimization
Table 3
Preference received (on the 1–6 scale) using either 1–6 preferences or relative preferences in the objective function
Job preference 1–6 preference used in objective function Relative preference used in objective function
# Assigned Cum% # Assigned Cum%
1 227 64.9 209 59.7
2 43 77.1 56 75.7
3 17 82.0 25 82.9
4 20 87.7 19 88.3
5 19 93.1 17 93.1
6 19 98.6 19 98.6
No. pref 5 100.0 5 100.0
Table 4
Preferences received (measured with the relative scale) using
either 1–6 preferences or relative preferences in the objective
function
Satisfaction
level (%)
Job preference measure
1–6 ranking Relative preferences
# Cum% # Cum%
100 234 66.9 238 68.0
90+ 0 66.9 5 69.4
75+ 8 69.1 14 73.4
50+ 25 76.3 37 84.0
25+ 20 82.0 17 88.9
10+ 22 88.3 15 93.1
<10 29 96.6 19 98.6
0 12 100.0 5 100.0
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model for the graduating class of 2003. In addi-
tion, the Personnel Center is modifying existing
software to incorporate this classification model
for both ROTC and OTS career field classifica-
tions.
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